We consider autonomous racing of two cars and present an approach to formulate the decision making as a non-cooperative non-zero-sum game. The game is formulated by restricting both players to fulfill static track constraints as well as collision constraints which depend on the combined actions of the two players. At the same time the players try to maximize their own progress. In the case where the action space of the players is finite, the racing game can be reformulated as a bimatrix game. For this bimatrix game, we show that the actions obtained by a sequential maximization approach where only the follower considers the action of the leader are identical to a Stackelberg and a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Furthermore, we propose a game promoting blocking, by additionally rewarding the leading car for staying ahead at the end of the horizon. We show that this changes the Stackelberg equilibrium, but has a minor influence on the Nash equilibria. For an online implementation, we propose to play the games in a moving horizon fashion, and we present two methods for guaranteeing feasibility of the resulting coupled repeated games. Finally, we study the performance of the proposed approaches in simulation for a set-up that replicates the miniature race car tested at the Automatic Control Laboratory of ETH Zürich. The simulation study shows that the presented games can successfully model different racing behaviors and generate interesting racing situations.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the major challenges in self-driving cars is the interaction with other cars. This holds true for public roads as well as race tracks, as the fundamental problem comes from the fact that the intentions of the other cars are not known. Autonomous driving and autonomous racing have been successfully demonstrated repeatedly [1] - [4] , while driving in close proximity with unpredictable vehicles on public roads was addressed in the DARPA Urban Challenge [5] . Urban driving remained an active field of research ever since [6] , [7] . Here we stay in this realm of driving in the presence of non-cooperative neighbors but concentrate on the more controlled environment of autonomous racing on a race track, where the rival cars/opponents generate a dynamically changing environment. In autonomous racing the goal is to drive as fast as possible around a predefined track, making it necessary to control the car at the limit of handling [3] . Moreover, in racing the interactions between the cars are governed by less strict rules than on public roads; for example, there are no lanes and lane changes are not indicated. This implies that while in autonomous driving one can develop methods that assume a minimum degree of cooperation from neighboring vehicles [8] - [10] , such an approach is more difficult for autonomous racing. Therefore, methods for autonomous racing often ignore obstacle avoidance altogether [3] , [11] , [12] , or only consider the avoidance of static obstacles [4] , [13] .
To deal with the uncertainty in the driving behavior of the opponent cars, we propose here a game theoretical approach to autonomous racing. Zero-sum game methods have been investigated for related problems in air traffic [14] and autonomous driving [15] . Since, however, they assume the worst-case behavior of the opponent, special care is needed to ensure that the resulting driving style is not too conservative for autonomous racing. Game theory has also been used to derive driver models to simulate and verify autonomous driving algorithms [16] , [17] . Those approaches do not assume a worst-case behavior and are typically investigated by means of Stackelberg equilibria. Adopting some of the assumptions of these game theory based driver models, we assume that in a race the competing car has no benefit from causing a collision. We propose to model the interactions between race cars as a non-cooperative non-zerosum game, where the players only get rewarded if they do not cause a collision. By restricting our attention to finite horizon two-player games, we derive a dynamic game that, under the additional hypothesis that the action set of the two players is finite is then reformulated as a bimatrix game. For this game we show that a sequential maximization approach, where the leader determines his trajectory independently of the follower, and the follower plays his best response, is identical to a Stackelberg equilibrium and a Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game. Furthermore, we propose a modified racing game that promotes blocking behavior, by rewarding actions that do not necessarily maximize progress towards the finishing line but instead aim at preventing the opponent from overtaking. For this modified game we show that the Stackelberg equilibrium is a blocking trajectory pair if one exists, which stands in contrast to the Nash equilibrium which only results in blocking trajectories in particular cases. The proposed approach is maybe closest related to [18] where a similar game theoretic approach to autonomous racing is proposed. However, similar to our first game the interactions between the players are limited to collision constraints, and they restrict their analysis to best-response dynamics.
For online implementation, we propose repeating the game in a receding horizon fashion, similar to Model Predictive Control (MPC), giving rise to a sequence of coupled games. The use of moving horizon games has been proposed in other applications [19] - [21] , as a method to tackle higher dimensional problems not tractable by dynamic programming. We investigate the sequence of coupled games and propose modified constraints based on viability theory which guarantee recursive feasibility and introduce an exact soft constraint reformulation that guarantees feasibility at all times.
Finally, we investigate the game formulations in a simulation study, replicating the miniature race car set-up presented in [4] , and investigate the influence of the game formulation on different performance indicators such as the number of overtaking maneuvers and the collision probability.
This paper is structured as follows, in Section II we derive the racing game and reformulate it as a bimatrix game. The optimal solution in terms of the Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium is studied in Section III. In Section IV the game is augmented with a reward that encourages blocking of the opponent car. In Section V, we discuss feasibility of moving horizon games. The performance of the approaches is investigated in a simulation study in Section VI, while Section VII provides some concluding remarks.
II. FORMULATION OF THE RACING GAME In a car race, the goal is to finish first; mathematically this can be interpreted as a non-cooperative dynamic game where each player tries to reach the finishing line before any other player. In F1 or similar racing series this game is tackled by separating it into two problems: the first problem concerns slowly changing tactical decisions (pit stops, power consumption, tire wear, etc.) and is solved by the pit crew [22] . These high-level decisions are then executed by a skilled race car driver, who solves the second problem by driving the car at the handling limit while interacting with other cars. In this paper, we concentrate on the task of the race car driver and formulate it as a dynamic game. In this section we encode the winning objective as "drive as fast as possible while avoiding collision with other cars". More complex interactions (prevent an overtaking maneuver by driving sub-optimally) are considered in Section IV. For simplicity, we consider racing between only two cars. Racing with multiple opponents can be treated similarly but is considerably more challenging from a computational point of view.
To formulate the racing game three building blocks are required, first an appropriate vehicle model, second an objective function representing the "drive as fast as possible" goal and third state constraints characterizing collisions.
We start with the path planning model of [23] as the vehicle model, where the dynamics are described by a nonlinear discrete-time system of the form
The statex = (X, Y, ϕ, m) ∈ R 4 represents the X and Y position in global coordinates, the angle ϕ and m denotes the constant velocity mode or in other words the current motion primitive. The input u ∈ U (m) decides which constant velocity mode is chosen next and U (m) constraints the concatenation of the constant velocity modes. The update equation for the statef : R 4 × R → R 4 encodes the kinematic constraints of the bicycle model and the dynamic constraints of the constant velocity segment updates and is defined in detail in [23] . We note that strictly speaking the model is hybrid since one of the states, the index m of the constant velocity segment, takes values in a finite set. Since the input constraints U (m) ensure that if m is initialized in this finite set it will never leave it, to simplify notation we can ignore this complication, however, embed m in the real line, and think of it as real-valued.
To define the objective function of the game, we extend the state by an additional variable, a lap counter c, leading to x = (x, c) ∈ R 5 . To define the dynamics of the lap counter we consider the center line of the track as a parametrized curve cl : [0, L) → R 2 , where 0 represents the "starting line"; note that the argument of the function cl loops from L back to 0 every time the car completes a lap. Given a state x ∈ R 5 , we define its projectionp : R 5 → [0, L) onto the center line using the first two components of the statep
Under the reasonable assumption that the track length is such that the car can only cover a fraction of one lap in a single sampling time, we then define the update equation of the lap counter by
Appending this update equation to the dynamicsf ofx gives rise to the dynamics of the combined state
Note that the lap counter also takes values in the discrete set of integers, but since its update equation is such that if initialized in this set it remains in this set, we again embed in the real line to simplify the notation. Finally, given a state x we define the progress function
that will form the basis for the objective function defined below.
To encode the objective function of each car as well as the fact that the cars should avoid collisions with each other one needs to consider both cars; we use the superscript p = 1, 2 to distinguish the state of the two cars. Furthermore, to formulate the racing game both cars start at their initial state denoted by x 1 and x 2 , and even thought both cars use the path planning model they may be described by different constant velocity modes, highlighted by the superscript in f p (·, ·) and U p . Therefore the dynamics of the two cars are given by,
Due to the discrete nature of the admissible inputs U p (m p ) there exist a finite number of state-input trajectories. These different trajectories are denoted by a subscript i = 1, ..., n for car 1 and j = 1, ..., m for car 2 and the time step along the trajectory with k = 1, ..., N , resulting in the following notation, where x 1 i (k) and x 2 j (k) denote the different trajectories of the two cars at time step k. Each trajectory of the two cars has an associated progress payoff, which is the progress (2) of the final state of each trajectory, thus the objective of the i-th and j-th trajectory of car 1 respectively car 2 is given by p(x 1 i (N )) and p(x 2 j (N )). In addition to progress, the objective function of the game should also reflect the fact that the car would like to remain on the track and avoid collisions with other cars. The first requirement can be encoded by a set X T ⊆ R 5 that encodes the requirement that the first two components of the state are within the physical limits of the track. One can then impose a constraint that for all k = 1, ..., N , x 1 i (k) ∈ X T , and x 2 j (k) ∈ X T (or more precisely, penalize the car in the objective function whenever this constraint is violated).
Finally the collision constraints couple the two players, in the sense that they depend on the actions of both players. One can encode this constraint through the signed distance 1 [24] . If we assume that each car can be described by a rotated rectangle (indeed any fixed shape) centred at the (X, Y, φ) component of the state, then the signed distance of the corresponding sets induces a function d :
2 ) ≥ 0 if and only if the two cars do not physically overlap. Thus, a trajectory pair (i, j) does not have a collision if the following constraint holds,
Combining the progress payoff, the track constraints and the collision constraints, we can formulate the racing game as a bimatrix game. Let us assume that the two cars are the players; thus player 1 (P1) has n possible trajectories, and player 2 (P2) has m possible trajectories constructed by combinatorially selecting inputs from the corresponding sets U 1 (m 1 ) and U 2 (m 2 ). The bimatrix game has two m × n payoff matrices A and B with elements a i,j and b i,j representing, respectively, the payoffs of P1 and P2, if P1 adopts trajectory i and P2 trajectory j. The payoff associated with a trajectory pair (i, j) encodes information about both the progress and the constraints.
Before formally introducing the racing game, let us give two definition and an assumptions used in the rest of the paper, mainly let us first define what we mean with "feasible".
Definition 1: A trajectory pair (i, j) is feasible for the constraints, if for all k = 1, ..., N , it holds that
Second, we define the leader of the game; generally, it can be hard to determine the leader in a game, but luckily in car races, it is straightforward since the car which is "ahead" is considered the leader.
Definition 2: The leader of the game is always the car which is ahead, where ahead is defined based on the progress, thus, if p(x 1 (0)) ≥ p(x 2 (0)) P1 is ahead of P2, and vice versa if p(x 1 (0)) < p(x 2 (0)) Finally, we assume for the rest of the paper that P1 is the leader of the game. Assumption 1: At the beginning of the game P1 is ahead of P2 or in other words p(x 1 (0)) ≥ p(x 2 (0)). Note that this assumption is of course without loss of generality.
A. Racing Game
The payoff matrices of the two players are formulated such that each player receives the progress payoff for a feasible trajectory, whereas trajectory pairs which violate the constraints receive a payoff strictly lower than the minimal progress payoff. The resulting payoff matrices can be computed as follows,
Where the singed distance between two sets R 1 ∈ R 2 and R 2 ∈ R 2 is defined as sd(
) the optimal trajectory pair will be feasible whenever possible since none of the players would benefit from violating the constraints, see Theorem 1 for a formal discussion. This condition can be fulfilled by choosing κ, λ < 0, as the progress is always positive. Furthermore, for the rest of the paper we assume that 0 > λ ≥ κ, which implicitly penalizes collisions less than leaving the track.
B. Sequential Racing Game
The racing game (5) can be simplified by using the leader-follower structure present in racing. Therefore, we assume that the leader (P1) does not need to consider the collision constraints (4) and only the follower (P2) is concerned with the collision avoidance. Due to this sequential structure the racing game simplifies to,
The main difference to the racing game (5) is the simplified payoff matrix of the leader. However, the price to pay is that feasibility of the game is more restrictive since the leader does not consider collisions, we again refer to Theorem 1 for a formal discussion.
C. Example
To visualize the racing game (5) and the sequential racing game (6) let us look at one racing situation with only three possible trajectories for each player, see Fig. 1 . We determine the progress by assuming that the zero point is at the beginning of the track interval shown and that the interval is 0.95 m long, with 12 cm long cars, which corresponds to the test track in our lab [4] and the scale used in the subsequent simulation study. Furthermore, by Assumption 1 P1 is the car in front and we use κ = −10 and λ = −1. Thus, we can determine the payoff matrices A and B of the racing game (5) as, 
For each player, the bottom trajectory leaves the track, so the payoff is κ = −10 for the corresponding trajectory, irrespective of the actions of the other player. This leads to the 3rd row of A and third column of B to be identically equal to −10. If both players select their middle trajectory, there is a collision hence the payoff is λ = −1 for both players, giving rise to the (2, 2) entry of −1 in the two matrices. The remaining combinations of actions neither leave the track nor cause a collision. Hence the payoff is the progress, giving rise to the entries in the order of 0.8 in the two matrices.
Similarly, the payoff matrices A and B for the sequential racing game (6) 
With the only difference being a 2,2 which is now 8.8 instead of −1, since only P2 considers collisions. In Section III we use this example to visualize the equilibrium solutions of the racing game (5) and the sequential racing game (6).
III. OPTIMAL NON-COOPERATIVE SOLUTION OF THE RACING GAME Given the bimatrix games (5) and (6), the question is how to find the optimal trajectory pair. First note that we only consider pure strategies, where the action space of the two players is given by Γ 1 := {1, 2, .., n} and Γ 2 := {1, 2, .., m}.
A. Stackelberg and Nash Equilibrium
Two of the most popular equilibrium concepts for bimatrix games are the Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium which are defined in the following.
1) Stackelberg Equilibrium: In the Stackelberg equilibrium, there exists a leader, and a follower and the leader can enforce his strategy on the follower. It is assumed that the follower plays rationally, in the sense that he plays the best response with respect to the strategy of the leader. Thus, the leader chooses the strategy which maximizes his payoff given the best response of the follower.
is a Stackelberg equilibrium of a bimatrix game A, B, with P1 as leader, if:
where R(i) := arg max j∈Γ 2 b i,j is the best response of P2 to the strategy i ∈ Γ 1 of P1. Note that a non-unique best strategy for the leader is an issue since all possibilities have the same payoff and the strategy gets announced to the follower [25] . Similarly, multiple best responses are considered by the leader and therefore the follower can simply determine his strategy using randomization.
2) Nash Equilibrium: The Nash equilibrium is a trajectory pair, such that there is no incentive for any of the players to choose another trajectory.
is a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game A, B if the following inequalities are fulfilled:
Note that according to Definition 4, there could be multiple Nash equilibria. In contrast to the Stackelberg equilibrium methods to resort multiple Nash equilibria in a non-cooperative manner can be hard since they do not lead to the same payoff [25] , one possibility is to use the notion of "betterness".
Definition 5 ([25] ):
A strategy pair (i 1 , j 1 ) is said to be better than a second strategy pair
, and if at least one of the inequalities is strict.
If a Nash equilibrium is better than another, none of the players has an advantage by choosing this equilibrium. Thus betterness allows discarding some of the eventual multiple equilibria.
B. Feasibility Assumptions
Since feasibility of a trajectory pair is fundamental for the game, but the constraints are only considered in the objective, it is interesting to investigate under which assumption a feasible trajectory pair is obtained. Therefore, two differently restrictive assumptions are made.
Assumption 2.a: There exists a trajectory pair (i, j) which is feasible according to Definition 1. The second part is more restrictive and is based on the payoff if the collision constraints are neglected. In other words, the payoff of the leader (P1) in the sequential racing game (6) . For the rest of the paper we denote this payoff as α i ,
else .
Assumption 2.b:
There exists a trajectory pair (i, j), such that max i∈Γ 1 α i > κ and max j∈Γ 2 b arg max i∈Γ 1 {α i },j > λ.
Note that, the payoff of the follower is identical in both the racing game (5) and the sequential racing game (6) , thus the assumption is well defined for both games. Further, max j∈Γ 2 b arg max i∈Γ 1 {α i },j > λ needs to hold for any element i ∈ arg max i∈Γ 1 {α i } individually. Finally, as aforementioned Assumption 2.b is more restrictive, since any racing game which fulfills Assumption 2.b also fulfills Assumption 2.a, however, the opposite does not necessarily hold.
C. Sequential Racing Game
When investigating the sequential racing game (6) in more detail one can see that it is not really a game since the decisions of the follower do not influence the decisions of the leader. Thus the optimal trajectory pair can simply be computed by a sequential maximization approach, where the leader finds his optimal trajectory without considering the follower. This trajectory is then announced to the follower, similar to the Stackelberg equilibrium, and the follower plays his best response. This can be summarized in the following two-step sequential maximization, which determines the sequential optimal trajectory pair (i s , j s ),
The sequential optimal trajectory pair (i s , j s ) has two main properties; first, it is the Stackelberg and the Nash equilibrium of the sequential racing game (6) , and second, if Assumption 2.b holds, the resulting trajectory pair is feasible. The first property can be shown using similar tools as used in the later proofs and is omitted in the interest of space, and the second follows directly from Assumption 2.b, which guarantees that the follower has a feasible response to the announced optimal trajectory of the leader.
Note that similar to the Stackelberg equilibrium multiple optimal trajectories for the leader do not pose a problem, since the cost is the same and the chosen trajectory is announced to the follower. Similarly, multiple best responses of the follower can also be resorted by randomization.
In the racing situation in Fig. 1 Assumption 2.b is fulfilled and the sequential optimal trajectory pair is (2, 1), where the car in front goes straight and the car in the back avoids the car in front by going left. When looking at the corresponding sequential racing game (8) , it can be verified that this trajectory pair is also a Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium.
D. Racing Game
Let us now focus on the more complex racing game (5) which does not exhibit the sequential structure of (6). However, when investigating the racing situation in Fig. 1 with the corresponding payoff matrices (7), we see that the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game is the trajectory pair (2, 1), which is identical to the sequential optimal trajectory pair. Furthermore, we can also verify that the sequential optimal trajectory pair is a Nash equilibrium. But this is not the only Nash equilibrium in the bimatrix game. More precisely there exist two Nash equilibria, additionally to the trajectory pair (2, 1) where the car in the back avoids the car ahead. Also the trajectory pair (1, 2) where the car ahead avoids the car in the back is a Nash equilibrium.
A natural question that arises is how can the two cars choose one of the two Nash equilibria. As aforementioned this is usually hard, in our example, if each player assumes that the equilibrium that maximizes his own progress will be chosen, this would result in the trajectory pair (2,2) which is not a Nash equilibrium and results in a collision 2 . This is because none of the Nash equilibria is better (see Definition 5) than the other, which is the basis for a non-cooperative equilibrium consensus [25] . To resolve this issue ahead of the game the players agree on rules about how to pick a Nash equilibrium in the case of multiple equilibria; we call those "rules of the road". Here we use a rule that says that if there are multiple Nash equilibria, the equilibrium with the largest payoff for the player ahead at the start of the game (P1 by Assumption 1) is chosen. In the racing situation in Fig. 1 , the Nash equilibrium which fulfills the rules of the road is the trajectory pair (2, 1). Thus, all the different equilibrium concepts, as well as the sequential maximization approach, lead to the same trajectory pair which in addition is also feasible. Indeed these observations are general as we show in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: (a) If Assumption 2.a holds, all Stackelberg equilibria are feasible and there exists at least one feasible Nash equilibrium and all feasible Nash equilibria are better than infeasible Nash equilibria. (b) If additionally Assumption 2.b holds, and Π s denotes the set of all trajectory pairs of the sequential maximization approach, Π st be the set of all Stackelberg equilibria, Π n,RoR the set of all Nash equilibria which fulfill the rules of the road and Π n the set of all Nash equilibria then,
Proof: The proof is based on one fundamental observation, due to the payoff structure in the racing game (5), more precisely the symmetry of the collision constraints, it holds that
Part (a): Due to Assumption 2.a and the definition of the best response, there exists a i ∈ Γ 1 such that b i,R(i) > λ for all trajectories j ∈ R(i), this further implies by (10) that a i,R(i) = p(x Thus, max i∈Γ 1 min j∈R(i) a i,j > λ and therefore all Stackelberg equilibria are feasible. Regarding the Nash equilibria, we can show that the Stackelberg equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, which by virtue of the previous point shows that the at least one Nash equilibrium exists which is feasible. Therefore, note that max i∈Γ 1 a i,R(i) = max i∈Γ 1 max j∈Γ 2 a i,j due to the payoff structure in the bimatrix game. This observation together with P2 playing best response shows that the Nash inequalities are fulfilled. Finally, to show that any feasible Nash equilibrium is better than an infeasible one, let us assume there is a feasible trajectory pair, but an infeasible Nash exists. Clearly at Nash at least one of the two players is not using their feasible trajectory, as otherwise, the Nash would be feasible. Moreover, none of the two players violates the track constraint; if they did, they could improve their payoff from κ to (at least) λ by switching to another trajectory, contradicting Nash. Hence neither is using their trajectory from the feasible pair, as if one was the other could unilaterally improve their payoff by also switching to their feasible trajectory, contradicting Nash again. An infeasible Nash equilibrium only exists if both players have a payoff of λ but for both players, any unilateral change would result in a payoff of λ or κ. However, any feasible Nash equilibrium is better than such an infeasible Nash equilibrium. In Fig. 2 and the corresponding payoff matrices (11) such an example is depicted. In the example two Nash equilibria exist, (2, 2) which is feasible with a payoff of (0.87, 0.89), and (1, 3) which is infeasible with a payoff of (−1, −1). The feasible Nash is better and thus preferable for both players. N ) ). This also shows that the sequential optimal trajectory pair is feasible and the set of trajectory pairs is non-empty.
Furthermore, the sequential optimal trajectory pair (i s , j s ) is identical to the Stackelberg equilibrium since by the above observation max i∈Γ 1 min j∈R(i) a i,j = max i∈Γ 1 α i . Thus, we can reformulate the Stackelberg equilibrium as,
which is identical to the sequential maximization approach (9) and proves the second equality. Lastly we can also show that the sequential optimal trajectory pair (i s , j s ) is a Nash equilibrium, and that this Nash equilibrium fulfills the rules of the road. We know that a i s ,j s = p(x 1 i s (N )), thus we have the following Nash inequalities,
Where the first inequality is true since p(x 1 i s (N )) is the best possible payoff for P1 and because P2 plays best response the second inequality is also true. Therefore, the trajectory pair (i s , j s ) is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the trajectory pair (i s , j s ) is the Nash equilibrium which fulfills the rules of the road, as it yields to the best possible payoff for P1, which shows the last two relationships.
There are two implications of the given relationship. First, we can use the sequential maximization approach to compute a Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium (if Assumption 2.b holds), which is computationally significantly cheaper, since it is not necessary to generate all entries of A and B. Most importantly collision checks are only necessary between the optimal trajectory of the leader and the possible trajectories of the follower; this dramatically reduces the computational burden as we will discuss in Section VI. Second, the only structure necessary is the fact that the decisions of the players are only linked by constraints, but the payoff if feasible solely depends on the players own actions. Thus, Theorem 1 would still hold if one uses objective functions other than the progress, e.g., fuel efficiency, tracking, or even in other applications that pose a similar structure.
Note that if Assumption 2.b is not fulfilled, the optimal trajectories are different. In the case of the Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium the leader will choose a trajectory which allows the follower to avoid a collision, as long as Assumption 2.a holds. On the other hand, in the sequential maximization (sequential racing game) the leader does not consider the follower and therefore, if Assumption 2.b does not hold the resulting trajectory pair is not feasible.
IV. RACING GAME WITH BLOCKING The racing game formulated in (5), only models interactions due to collisions, while both players only try to maximize their own progress. When racing, however, maximizing progress is only a means to an end, the real objective is to finish first. In some cases it may therefore be beneficial to prevent the opponent from overtaking, even if that means less progress. We refer to this behavior as "blocking". In this section we present a modification of the payoff function used in (5) that rewards staying ahead at the end of the horizon, and thereby rewards blocking behavior. The resulting game can again be reformulated as a bimatrix game where the elements of the payoff matrices A and B are given by,
Where w ≥ 0 is a parameter that implements a trade-off between staying ahead and maximizing progress. Note that in this case there are two terms linking the payoff of the two players, the collision constraint in the second line in (12) and the blocking reward in the fourth line; thus a sequential maximization approach is not possible.
To visualize the effect of the additional payoff term, we look at a slightly modified version of the racing situation illustrated in Fig. 3 , where compared to Fig. 1 both players have one additional trajectory and P2 has the chance to overtake P1. The racing situation with the corresponding bimatrix game (13) illustrates that the additional payoff term promotes the blocking behavior, since the Stackelberg equilibrium (2, 1) of the game is a blocking trajectory where P1 drives a curve to prevent getting overtaken at the end of the horizon. In contrast the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game without blocking payoff is (3, 2) , where P1 drives straight to maximize his progress, but P2 is able to overtake P1 at the end of the horizon.
To formalize the discussion we start by defining a blocking trajectory pair; therefore, let (i rg , j rg ) denote the Stackelberg equilibrium of the racing game (5).
Definition 6: A trajectory pair (i, j), is a blocking trajectory pair if the following properties hold: (i) the Stackelberg equilibrium of the racing game (i rg , j rg ) is such that P1 gets overtaken at the end of the horizon p(x In other words, a blocking trajectory pair corresponds to a collision-free trajectory pair where P1 is ahead at the end of the horizon. P1 achieves this by choosing a trajectory, such that any trajectory of P2 that would achieve a higher progress collides with this trajectory of P1. The last condition also implies that P2 plays a best response, as any other trajectory would lead to a smaller payoff. 
is the Stackelberg equilibrium of the bimatrix game (12) .
Proof: From Theorem 1 we know that (i rg , j rg ) is feasible, and since the constraints are the same in the racing game with and without blocking, we know that this trajectory pair is also feasible for the racing game with blocking. Thus, if p(
, it follows that the payoffs for the racing game with blocking of this trajectory pair are, a i rg ,j rg = p(x 1 i rg (N )) + w and b i rg ,j rg = p(x 2 j rg (N )). We now show that j rg is the best response of P2 to i rg given the payoff with blocking (12) . We know that j rg maximizes the progress given i rg due to the formulation of the racing game (5), and since the additional payoff only depends on the progress, we know that no other trajectory would get the additional reward, thus j rg is the best response. Second, i rg maximizes the payoff for P1, therefore, (i rg , j rg ) is also the Stackelberg equilibrium of the racing game with blocking.
Second if p(x
j rg (N )) and there exists no blocking trajectory pair (i b , j b ), or in other words P1 can not avoid the overtaking maneuver, the payoff of P1 does not depend on the blocking payoff, and is therefore maximized by i rg . As j rg leads to the largest possible progress for P2 and by definition gets the additional reward w, j rg is also the best response for the racing game with blocking (12) .
Third let us assume there exists a blocking trajectory pair (i b , j b ). The pair will be chosen if it leads to the largest payoff for the two players. For P1 this is the case if p(x B. Nash Equilibrium Proposition 2: If Assumption 2.a holds, the Stackelberg equilibrium (i rg , j rg ) of the racing game (5) is a Nash equilibrium of the racing game with blocking (12) . And only if a blocking trajectory (i b , j b ) is a Nash equilibrium of the game without blocking payoff (5) it is a Nash equilibrium of the game with blocking (12) .
Proof: From Theorem 1 we know that (i rg , j rg ) is feasible, and since the constraints are the same in the racing game with and without blocking, we know that this trajectory pair is also feasible for the racing game with blocking. To show that (i rg , j rg ) is a Nash equilibrium of the racing game with blocking (12), two cases are possible. First, p(x In the first case due to the fact that j rg is the best response in terms of progress we know that if j rg does not get the additional reward, no other trajectory gets the reward. Therefore, it holds that for all j ∈ Γ 2 , b i rg ,j rg ≥ b i rg ,j . As a consequence for P2 the trajectory pair (i rg , j rg ) fulfills the Nash inequality. For P1 the Nash inequality a i rg ,j rg ≥ a i,j rg is fulfilled since it is the largest feasible payoff for P1. In the second case a similar argument holds, which is omitted in the interest of space. Thus, (i rg , j rg ) is a Nash equilibrium of the racing game with blocking (12) even though the additional payoff is not considered in the computation of the trajectory pair.
For the second part, we now assume that the Nash equilibrium is a blocking trajectory pair (i b , j b ). The Nash inequality for P2 b i b ,j b ≥ b i b ,j is always fulfilled by Definition 6, since no action of P2 can get the additional payoff w and j b is the best response of P2. However, the Nash inequality for P1,
, it holds that a i,j b ≤ λ. This condition, however, is identical to the one required by the Nash equilibrium of the racing game (5) without blocking payoff. Thus, for (i b , j b ) to be a Nash equilibrium of the racing game with blocking payoff (12) , it also needs to be a Nash equilibrium of the racing game without blocking payoff (5).
C. Discussion of the equilibrium solution
When looking at the racing example in Fig. 3 , the Stackelberg equilibrium is (2, 1) which is the blocking trajectory. However, the Nash equilibrium fulfilling the rules of the road is (3, 2) , where P2 overtakes P1 at the end of the horizon. This illustrates, that if the goal is to encourage blocking the Stackelberg equilibrium is the appropriate equilibrium concept. Furthermore, this also shows that blocking needs an asymmetric information pattern, which is logical as the leader needs to be sure that he can enforce the blocking trajectory on the follower.
One can recognize that the racing game with blocking subsumes the normal racing game, more precisely for w = 0 the two games are identical. This poses the question for which values of w the equilibrium changes. This question can be answered for the Stackelberg equilibrium using Proposition 1. For a game instance where a blocking trajectory pair (i b , j b ) exists, there is a discrete change in the optimal trajectory pair when increasing w, this switch occurs the moment p(x 
V. MOVING HORIZON GAMES
The games presented in Section II and IV are finite horizon open-loop games, which as such can be used to analyze driving behavior. However, to introduce feedback we propose to play the games in a moving horizon fashion. Thus, solving the game with the full horizon but only applying the first input, at the next time step the game is newly generated based on the current state measurement and then solved again. Similar to [20] and [21] , this approximation allows solving games with short prediction horizons N where dynamic programming approaches would fail, due to the high state dimension.
However, moving horizon games come with similar problems as moving horizon control (e.g., MPC), one of them is the potential loss of feasibility. This is an inherent problem of moving horizon approaches which in general do not guarantee feasibility in closed-loop operation. In MPC this problem is tackled in two ways: first by using terminal set constraints which ensure recursive feasibility of the MPC control law, by guaranteeing that the terminal state is within an invariant set [26] . Second using soft constraints, which renders the problem feasible at all times [27] . In the following, we will show similar approaches for the presented racing games. We first introduce modified constraints which guarantee recursive feasibility and second we derive an exact penalty soft constraint reformulation.
Both approaches are based on a generalized racing game where the dynamics (3) and state constraints (4) are used as in the two previous formulations, however, a general objective function J p (x 
A. Recursive Feasibility
If the goal is to guarantee feasibility of the racing game at all times when played in a receding horizon fashion, we can use tools from viability theory similar to the approach proposed in [23] . Viability theory is concerned with finding the set of initial conditions for which there exist a solution to a difference inclusion which forever remains within a given closed constraint set K, also known as a viable solution [28] . Discrete-time viability theory is well suited to establish recursive feasibility since controlled discretetime systems x k+1 = f (x k , u k ), can be formulated as a difference inclusion x k+1 ∈ F (x k ) with F (x) = {f (x, u)|u ∈ U }. The largest set of initial conditions for which viable solutions exist is called the viability kernel (denoted by Viab F (K)) and can be computed by means of the viability kernel algorithm. The main requirement for the algorithm to converge is upper-semicontinuity of the set-valued map F (x), see Appendix A for a summary and [29] for more details. To establishing recursive feasibility, the state needs to remain within the viability kernel using the correct dynamics and constraints, where the constraints and dynamics are related to the feasible region of the racing game.
In this paper two approaches to find a trajectory pair are of interest: the Stackelberg equilibrium, and the sequential maximization approach. The difference between the two approaches lies in the feasible region of the problem. The Stackelberg approach is feasible if there exist a trajectory pair which is feasible, see Theorem 1, whereas the sequential maximization approach requires the more restrictive Assumption 2.b to hold. Assumption 2.b requires the leader to have a trajectory fulfilling the track constraints and the follower needs to be able to avoid the optimal trajectory of the leader while staying within the track. Thus, the two approaches need slightly different viability kernels to guarantee recursively feasibility.
1) Stackelberg equilibrium: Theorem 1 extends to the generalized racing game since the proof does not rely on the objective function but only on the payoff structure. Thus, we know that the Stackelberg equilibrium of the bimatrix game (14) is feasible if there exists a feasible trajectory pair. This implies that the problem always remains feasible if the state stays within the viability kernel of combined constraints subject to the stacked dynamics. Since this viability kernel describes all states for which there exist cooperative collision free trajectories of the two players which remains within the track. To compute the viability kernel we need to consider the stacked state ξ = [x 1 ; x 2 ] with the corresponding difference inclusion,
and the constraint set,
Due to [23] we know that slight modifications of the dynamics guarantee that F (ξ) is upper-semicontinuous and K is closed.
to prevent unwanted switching behavior, see [31] . The discrete state h is 1 if P1 is the leader and 2 if P2 is the leader. The disadvantage is that the resulting system is a discrete time hybrid system which requires a hybrid viability kernel algorithm [32] . However, the advantage is that then for each hybrid state the dynamics are continuous. Notice that the changed leader-follower switch needs to be included in the rules of the road. Given this two modification the difference inclusion, involving the discrete states, is given by ξ k+1 ∈ F (h k , ξ k ), with the set-valued map F (h, ξ) defined as follows,
Note that the reset function and guard are omitted in interest of space, however, since they result from a spatial regularization of the leader-follower switch they can be obtained similar to the examples in [31] . Finally, the constraint set K, is identical for the two discrete states and remains the same as in the Stackelberg case (16) . Proposition 4: The sequential maximization trajectory pair (i s , j s ) of the racing game (14) is recursively feasible if played in a moving horizon fashion (and therefore a Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium), when the leader playsψ p (x p ) the viable optimal policy (18) , and the state trajectory of the follower remains within Viab F (K), where F (ξ) as defined in (19) and K as defined in (16) .
Proof: If the leader plays theψ p (x p ), the state always remains in the viability kernel and is thereby recursively feasible with respect to the track constraints. By staying in his viability kernel the follower can always avoid a collision with the optimal trajectory while staying within the track, which implies that the follower is also recursively feasible.
3) Discussion: Since the discussed viability kernels depend on the stacked state ξ ∈ R 10 it is intractable to compute the kernels for the racing game. However, due to the similarities of the two kernels we can draw some conclusions: For the leader, the viability kernel resulting from the Stackelberg case is an inner approximation of the viability kernel the leader needs to fulfill in the sequential maximization approach which only considers the track constraints. For the follower, the viability kernel required in the sequential maximization is an inner approximation of the viability kernel required in the Stackelberg case, as the leader needs to be able to avoid one trajectory, whereas in the Stackelberg case the problem is cooperative. Furthermore, notice that staying within the individual viability kernels with respect to the track constraints is a necessary condition for recursive feasibility of the game (14) . Since these kernels can be computed, we can use them as a first approximation in a real implementation.
B. Soft Constraints
To derive a soft constraint reformulation for the general racing game (14) we look at the special case where only the collision constraints are reformulated as soft constraints, as these are the interesting constraints which link the decisions of the players. The soft constraint reformulation is achieved by relaxing the collision constraint with a positive slack variable s, which is penalized in the objective function. Therefore, the modified collision constraints for a trajectory pair (i, j) is given by,
with s i,j (k) ≥ 0 the slack multiplier at time step k corresponding to the trajectory pair (i, j), and the modified objective function of the p-th player is given by,
Where, S i,j = N k=1 s i,j (k) is the sum of the slack multipliers of a trajectory pair and q is the weight penalizing collisions between the two cars. Resulting in the following bimatrix game,
Notice that similar to the collision constrains the track constraints can also be formulated as soft constraints, but in the case of multiple soft constraint S i,j = N k=1 s i,j (k) ∞ needs to be considered. One crucial property of a soft constraint reformulation is exactness, in other words, there should exist a weight q such that the optimal trajectory pair of the soft and the hard constrained problem are identical if the original problem is feasible. For MPC problems this question was answered in [27] and relates to the dual multiplier of the optimization problem. In this paper, we will show that since U p (m p ) is finite, under some further mild assumptions there exists a weight q that guarantees an exact soft constraint reformulation. We define an exact reformulation as follows, given a feasible Nash equilibrium or a Stackelberg equilibrium of the hard constrained problem (14) , the same trajectory pair is also an equilibrium of the soft constrained problem (20) .
To formalize the problem let Γ 1 T and Γ
2
T be all trajectories which fulfill the track constraints. Notice that as long as for both players there exists a trajectory which stays inside the track and κ is chosen small enough the Stackelberg equilibrium does not leave the track and there exists a Nash equilibrium which does not leave the track. The argument is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and a small enough κ exists as long as J p i,j and S i,j are bounded and q is finite. Therefore, to show exactness we only need consider trajectory pairs (i, j) ∈ Γ 
guarantees that the soft constraint reformulation is exact. Proof: A sufficient condition to have an exact reformulation is to guarantee that the none of the payoffs, of the soft constrained problem is larger than the payoff of the trajectory pair (i * , j * ) of the hard constrained problem. Since in this case, the Nash inequalities still hold for (i * , j * ), and the maximization in the Stackelberg equilibrium is also not affected. Therefore, we have an exact reformulation if the following inequality holds,
Or in other words every sub-optimal trajectory pair which fulfills the track constraints, has to have a smaller payoff than the optimal hard constraint trajectory pair (i * , j * ). Given the inequality (22) , the bound (21) can be obtained by reordering.
For the cases multiple trajectory pairs have the same optimal payoff, q can still be computed identically since the payoff of all these trajectory pairs is identical.
Note that in the case of the racing game, it is possible to bound q since J p i,j and S i,j can be upper bounded for all initial conditions. However, the soft constraints destroy the structure exploited to prove Theorem 1. Therefore, to find an optimal trajectory pair it is necessary to determine the Stackelberg or Nash equilibrium. Even though it is still possible to compute a trajectory pair based on the sequential maximization approach, the resulting trajectory pair does not necessarily correspond to a Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium if the soft constraints are active.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS Our simulation study replicates the miniature race car set-up, hosted at the automatic control laboratory at ETH Zürich [4] . The set-up consists of miniature race cars measuring 12×5 cm, driving around an approximately 18 m long track (https://youtu.be/RlZdMojOni0). To simulate the cars we use a dynamical bicycle model with nonlinear tire forces as described in [4] .
To achieve high-performance driving we use a two-level hierarchical controller following the structure of [23] . The upper level of the controller generates a trajectory pair of the racing game and is based on the path planning model studied in the experimental set-up of [23] . The path planning model makes use of the so-called constant velocity segments to generate a tree of alternative paths for each car. To provide a longer prediction horizon at a manageable computation burden longer sampling times and fewer prediction steps are used. Following [23] , for the path planning model we use number prediction steps N = 3, discretization time T pp = 0.16 s and number of constant velocities N m = 129. Note that brute force implementation of the racing bimatrix game would, in this case, require forming two 129 3 × 129 3 payoff matrices, clearly a formidable computational task. Note that we will discuss how the trajectory trees can be pruned prior to the formulation of the game to maintain computational tractability. Fig. 4 shows an example of trajectories resulting from the path planning model. At the lower level, we employ an MPC controller to track the trajectories corresponding to the optimal trajectory pair. The lower level MPC uses the linearized bicycle model, and also enforces track constraints; more details can be found in [23] . . Possilbe trajectories of the path planning model for two cars using the viability-based pruning presented in [23] To form payoff matrices we rely on the viability-based pruning of the trajectories [23] , which excludes trajectories that are doomed to leave the track either now or at a later stage. Following [23, Section 4] we use either the viability or the discriminating kernel to prune the trajectories, the two kernels lead to comparable lap times but differences in driving style that, in the context of the present paper, result in interesting racing behaviors. More precisely, the discriminating-kernel-based pruning results in a more conservative driving style, breaking earlier into curves but thereby achieving higher exit velocities out of curves, whereas the viability-kernel-based pruning results in a more aggressive driving style. In the following, PV is the player using the viability kernel and PD the player using the discriminating kernel to prune the trajectories. We then compute collisions using a two-step collision detection: first, the distance between the center of the cars is checked, if the distance is small enough for a collision to be possible in a second step a separating axis collision detection algorithm is used [33] . Finally, we compute progress of all remaining trajectories, where the projection (1) is computed by first generating offline a piecewise affine approximation of the center line, comprising 488 pieces, online the projection can then be computed by finding the closest affine piece and taking an inner product. In the racing game with blocking we further determine which trajectories receive the stay ahead reward based on the aforehand computed progress. All the task except the path planning model run at a sampling time of 20 ms allowing for accurate collision checks and fast feedback. To be able to react fast to the changes of the opponent player and to deal with model mismatch also the racing game is repeated every 20 ms.
The last implementation detail is concerned with the soft constraints, any constraint violation of more than 1 cm is treated as a collision between the cars. Note that thereby the problem is not always feasible and that in a case where no feasible solution can be found the car behind initiates an emergency braking maneuver, until the problem is feasible again.
A. Simulation of the Racing Game
The racing game is evaluated in a simulation study, where the cars are started at 500 different random initial positions along the center line of the track. To guarantee feasible initial conditions the cars are started at a low forward velocity of 0.5 m/s, oriented tangentially to the center line. To promote interesting racing situations we choose the initial position of the two cars in close proximity (0-20 cm apart) and physical parameters of both cars are chosen identical, including engine power, braking power, and tire models. For each initial position, the simulation is run for 40 s, which corresponds to approximately four laps.
We compare three cases of the presented racing games. The first two are based on the racing game (5), in the first case the optimal strategy pair is computed using the sequential maximization approach (corresponding to the sequential racing game (6) ) and in the second case the Stackelberg equilibrium is computed. In the third case, we study the racing game with blocking (12) solved to the Stackelberg equilibrium, with w = 100 which is chosen such that blocking is promoted whenever possible (see Proposition 1) . Note that the solutions of the first two approaches are identical if Assumption 2.b is fulfilled. However, if Assumption 2.b is not fulfilled, in the Stackelberg case the leader will choose a trajectory which allows the follower to avoid a collision, in the sequential maximization approach, on the other hand, a colliding trajectory pair is picked. Let us start by noting that in all cases we observe a substantial number of overtaking maneuvers (see Table I ), even though both cars have the same power, and only differ in the pruning strategies they employ. However, it is visible that the sequential maximization approach has the fewest overtaking maneuvers. The racing game solved to the Stackelberg equilibrium, in contrast, has by far the most overtaking maneuvers, whereas the racing game with blocking has approximately half as many overtaking maneuvers. It is also interesting to see that the two implementations solving the bimatrix game to the Stackelberg equilibrium have an evenly distributed number of overtaking maneuvers between the different pruning strategies, there are even slightly more overtaking by the viability-kernel-based player (PV). This stands in contrast to the sequential maximization approach, where nearly all overtaking maneuvers are performed by the discriminating-kernel-based player (PD). When looking at the probability of a collision, we can see that all three implementations have a low empirical collision probability of around 5 · 10 −3 , especially considering that the cars start nearby. The racing game solved to the Stackelberg equilibrium has the lowest collision probability and the sequential maximization the highest. The main reason for the observed trends is first and foremost the fact that in the sequential maximization approach the leader does not consider the follower. This explains the fewer overtaking maneuvers, the higher collision probability, and the observation that PV has nearly no overtaking maneuvers. Almost all overtaking maneuver need a certain cooperation between the cars, and this holds especially when PV overtakes PD. In the sequential maximization approach the leader does not consider the follower and ignores the risk of a collision. Due to the layout of the track, this is an advantage for PD, which can prevent nearly all overtaking maneuvers, whereas PV is not able to do so. This is also related to the number of emergency braking maneuvers due to infeasibility in the game (see emergency braking probability in Table I ). The occurrence of emergency braking maneuvers, counted by the number of time steps the emergency brake was applied, is more than three times higher in the case of the sequential maximization approach, where 99% of the emergency braking maneuvers occur if PV is the follower. In the Stackelberg cases the leader adapts his strategy to accommodate the follower. This helps to prevent collisions without relying on an emergency braking maneuver, but at the same time allows for overtakes by the opposing car. In the racing game with blocking the leader does consider the follower, and helps to prevent a collision, but at the same time actively tries to avoid overtaking maneuvers. This, in the end, results in a middle ground between the two controllers for the games based on (6) and (5) concerning overtaking maneuvers and collision probability.
When further investigating the emergency braking probability, we see that the probability of an emergency brake is lower than the collision probability. This is the case since a collision can occur without triggering an emergency brake due to the soft constraint formulation and the 1 cm allowed penetration. Not all emergency braking maneuvers result in a collision in the near future, e.g., in the sequential maximization approach, only 54.9% of all emergency braking situation lead to a collision within the next 0.16 s (see last row of Table I ). However, for the Stackelberg cases the percentage of emergency braking situation leading to a collision is significantly higher, which can be explained since in the Stackelberg cases the emergency brake is only triggered if there is no possibility to avoid a collision. However, since the emergency brake is more powerful than the standard break in our simulation, it is possible to prevent some of the collisions.
Lastly, what is interesting but not directly visible from Table I is that there is no relationship between the used method and the occurrence of an overtaking maneuver, i.e., for 407 of the 500 initial positions an overtaking maneuver occurs but only for 27 initial positions all three approaches have an overtaking maneuver.
To further highlight the difference between the three different game approaches, one of the 500 simulation runs is shown in a video which can be found at: https://youtu.be/3Skl5qeFum8 for the sequential maximization approach, https://youtu.be/Cp9OchB2S M for the racing game solved to the Stackelberg equilibrium, and https://youtu.be/Xxa8W9D3Z A for the racing game with blocking. The videos emphasize the above-discussed points, where the sequential maximization approach has zero overtaking maneuvers but there are collisions, in the racing game with blocking there is only one overtaking maneuver, but in the racing game solved using the Stackelberg equilibrium there are three overtaking maneuvers.
B. Remarks on difference in driving style and car dynamics
The above simulation study investigated the case where one player PV uses the viability and the other player PD the discriminating kernel to prune their trajectories. Thus, the driving style of the two players is quite different, with PV being "aggressive" and PD "cautious." However, both players have the same model and identical cars. To further investigate the influence of different driving styles and differences in the cars, we also investigated the effect of a reduced motor power of the leading car as well as using the same approach to prune the trajectories for both players; where the latter results in a race between identical cars and drivers. The simulation results show that reducing the motor power of the leading car leads to more overtaking maneuvers. However, the influence is smaller than expected as the power constraint mainly influenced the maximal velocity, which is not too important in the used track layout. Using the same pruning strategy for both players drastically reduced the amount of overtaking maneuvers. However, even though the drivers and the cars are identical overtaking maneuvers still occur. In conclusion, we noticed that the change in the driving style, introduced by different pruning strategies, seems to be more important than power differences between the cars.
C. Computation time
Simulations were carried out on a computer running Debian equipped with 16 GB of RAM and a 3.6 GHz Intel Xeon quad-core processor. When investigating the computation times reported in Table II , one can see that the computation times for the trajectory generation step is very similar for all three cases, which is expected as the different cases only have a minor influence on the trajectory planning phase. However, the collision check for the sequential maximization approach is significantly faster than the collision checks for the two Stackelberg cases, where it is clearly the bottleneck of the method. The reason is that the Stackelberg cases require checking collisions of all trajectories of both players with each other. Roughly speaking this computation grows quadratically in the number of trajectories available to the players and can result in up to 10 9 collision checks. In the sequential maximization approach, collisions are only checked between the best trajectory of the leader and all trajectories of the follower. In this case, the number of collision checks grows linearly in the number of trajectories available to the players and is therefore significantly faster. We can say that the sequential maximization approach is close to real-time feasible, whereas the two Stackelberg cases are significantly slower and would need radical changes to implement in real-time.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented a non-cooperative game approach for one-to-one racing of two autonomous cars. Two approaches to model the interaction between the two players were considered and formulated as bimatrix games. In the first approach the interaction is limited to collision constraints, and each player optimizes his progress. The second approach augments the cost function by rewarding staying ahead at the end of the horizon to emphasize blocking behavior. For online implementation the game is played in a moving horizon fashion and two methods were proposed to deal with the loss of feasibility in closed-loop. A simulation study shows that the proposed games can be used for competitive autonomous racing of two cars. The main observation is that the sequential maximization approach where the follower is completely neglected seems to be the most efficient blocking technique in closed-loop, but also comes with the highest risk of a collision.
In future work, we plan to implement the controller on our experimental set-up. To make this possible the computation time has to be substantially decreased. We envision accomplishing this by, among others, more efficient trajectory pruning techniques and exploiting the parallelizability of the method.
APPENDIX A VIABILITY THEORY Viability theory investigates for which initial conditions does there exist a solution to a difference inclusion, which stays within a constraint set forever [28] . This question is of interest for controlled discrete-time systems x k+1 = f (x k , u k ), since they can be formulated as a difference inclusion x k+1 ∈ F (x k ) with F (x) = {f (x, u)|u ∈ U }. Where x ∈ R n is the state, u ∈ U ⊂ R m is the control input and f : R n × U → R n a continuous function. Based on this difference inclusion and a given constraint set K ⊂ R n , the set of initial condition for which a viable solution exist can be computed using the viability kernel algorithm of [29] . Where viable solutions are solutions to the difference inclusion x k+1 ∈ F (x k ) which stay in K forever.
Definition 7 ([29]):
A set D ⊂ R n is a discrete viability domain of F if F (x) ∩ D = ∅ for all x ∈ D. The discrete viability kernel of a set K ⊂ R n under F , denoted by Viab F (K), is the largest closed discrete viability domain contained in K. The viability kernel can be calculated through the so called viability kernel algorithm:
for which the following property holds. Proposition 6 ( [29] ): Let F be an upper-semicontinuous set-valued map with closed values and let K be a closed subset of Dom(F ). Then,
